Qualitative Research

Mid-Term Essay

Pragmatism

Steve Alcorn

ELPA 7812

Professor Franklin

                                                            March 15, 2006
            Pragmatism is a philosophy based upon the works and writings of Charles Pierce and of William James and of John Dewey.  Historically, pragmatism falls within the general category of being a Post-Modern philosophy, one which, to a large degree, defines itself by and/or against those philosophies and ideologies that came before.  Sharply contrasting with realism on many points, pragmatism, for instance, embraces not only the quantitative world of realism, but also and, perhaps, most especially the qualitative research disciplines in its quest for, basically, what truly works and what is individually prized by the individual in a given situation.  Pragmatism has its own take on the eternal questions and mysteries of metaphysics, axiology, epistemology, and logic, and its influence is found in a number of aspects of the practical realities of higher education today.

            Metaphysics refers to “the study of ultimate reality” (Sahakian and Sahakian, 1965, p. 299).  What is reality?  How is it to be found?  How is reality meant to be understood?  Metaphysically, pragmatism embraces the notion of plural and dynamic realities.  The pragmatist is one who rejects the narrow confines and strictures of absolutism (Machan, 1977), one who sees and embraces the possibility of multiple truths (Drake, 1933/1968).

            Eames (1977) stated that pragmatism as a new paradigm became necessary in the wake of absolutism and its downfall, and that pragmatism is “needed to reflect a more accurate account of reality” (p. 105), for “reality is changing and that knowledge which is built upon this reality necessarily changes with it” (p. 105), thus envisaging a “universe that is emerging, pluralistic, and open to new possibilities” (p. 106).  Not accepting of the strictly dogmatic and ultimately limited single reality of the absolutist, then, pragmatics value the individual and, by natural and practical extension, the individual’s reality.

            Drake (1933/1968) said, quite appropriately, it would seem, that this pluralistic account, or, rather, these pluralistic accounts of reality are to be expected, for this “apparent paradox of truths that are changing and contradictory is the inevitable result of our human limitations” (p. 94).  Rather than to be seen as a weakness, as from the perspective of an absolutist, the pragmatic view of a myriad of elastic possibilities is, indeed, to be marked as and considered as a strength.

            It follows, then, that from an axiological sense a pragmatist values an appreciation of and a concentrated looking into the connections that the individual forms with the surrounding environment.  Eames (1977) noted that all facets of pragmatic inquiry and study should be devoted to that which the individual “selects and rejects from the environment” (p. 129).  Particular note should be given to that which is desired, and, as seen regarding the metaphysics of pragmatism, that which is desired is entirely subjective.

            Going along with this subjectivity, and, again, mirroring certain metaphysical aspects of pragmatism, is the notion that what is desired and is of interest to the individual now may change later (Eames, 1977).  As new knowledge about what we desire (axiologically) is acquired and assimilated into our (metaphysical) pre-existing sense of reality, then, it follows, then, that the value that is placed on certain things will alter, thus shifting the individual’s overarching perception of personal reality.

            Epistemology, following from metaphysics and axiology, then, has to do with this knowledge and how it is perceived and acquired (Sahakian and Sahakian, 1965).  Pragmatists hold that knowledge is found through and by experience.  Just as, from the metaphysical and axiological standpoints, the pragmatist embraces and celebrates the diversity of often conflicting and protean realities shaped and tempered by that which is potentially valued and discarded within said realities, from an epistemological point of view, the pragmatist, to perceive and, thus, to gain knowledge, uses whatever strategy will work most efficaciously.  Depending upon the context that is under consideration and scrutiny, in order to gain knowledge and, thus, to add building blocks to aforementioned personalized and idiosyncratic truth(s), a pragmatist will vary methods of inquiry to suit the context.

            Rorty (1982), in the introduction to his book Consequences of Pragmatism, had this to say about how pragmatism seeks to gain knowledge:

            It views science as one genre of literature – or, put the other way around,          literature and the arts as inquiries, on the same footing as scientific inquiries.  Thus it sees ethics as neither      more “relative” or “subjective” than scientific             theory, not as needing to be made more “scientific.”  Physics is a way of trying to           cope with various bits of the             universe; ethics is a matter of trying to cope with            other bits.  Mathematics helps physics do its job; literature and the arts help ethics do its.  Some of these   inquiries come up with propositions, some with narratives,         some with paintings.          (p. xliii)

A pragmatist will use the available tools at hand to do accomplish their goals.

            Eames (1977) stressed this propensity in pragmatism of using whatever will work best to do whatever is being done, and he further asserted the importance of remembering that “in every situation, whether in astronomy or psychology or value studies, one must select from among the various specific procedures those which are useful” (p. 128).  This belief allows for a wider net to be cast when approaching and examining a particular idiosyncratic reality from a Pragmatic point of view.

            From a logical perspective, also, pragmatism embraces a diversity of means.  Logical reasoning, in pragmatism, can be both inductive and deductive.  One may either, depending upon the context, induce a conclusion based upon observation and delineation of various phenomena or one may deduce based upon logical consideration.  Eames (1977) stated on this note that “Deductive processes and inductive processes work together, not in isolation, and both of these are never cut off from the development of a hypothesis and other data relevant to the problem at hand” (p. 103).

            Pragmatism can be seen in many facets of the world.  One such area is education, and John Dewey is often regarded as the preeminent pragmatic philosopher in this realm.  Dewey wrote a number of books about education (Murphy, 1990), and, with Arthur O. Lovejoy, founded the American Association of University Professors (Balch, 2004), serving, in fact, as the first president of this organization (Murphy, 1990).  Dewey’s influence is felt not only in public education, where, perhaps, he’s had the most influence, but also in higher education.  Indeed, the two seemingly disparate arenas are very much related.  Of this sometimes overlooked relationship, Katz (2006) stated that “Dewey saw reforming elementary and secondary education as necessary to instituting a more-pragmatic curriculum in higher education” (para. 10).

            Of this pragmatic curriculum, Dewey viewed education as “a continuous reconstruction of experience in which there is a development of immature experience toward experience funded with the skills and habits of intelligence” (cited in Murphy, 1990, p. 61).  The school would not only be a repository of knowledge, but schools would be a platform for legitimate social transformation.

            As such, Dewey and Arthur O. Lovejoy (as cited in Katz, 2005) advocated a focus on cognitive development and on the growth of the individual student, remaining inherently neutral regarding specifics of content.  This approach, which Dewey and Lovejoy implemented, respectively, at Columbia and at Johns Hopkins, has acted as the foundation of liberal education.

            However, Katz (2006) reported that this focus on a Dewey-inspired liberal education has become blunted, asserting that a true liberal education is being crammed into the last two years of high school and into the first two years of college.  This is attributed, in part, to how educators, in egalitarian efforts to offer an education fit for all, have instead created a pedagogy that has dulled the theoretical sharp edge of a liberal and well-rounded education.  In high school instruction, there is an emphasis on basic skills acquisition and rote learning of information in an effort to bolster standardized test scores at the expense of higher levels of learning, and higher education’s general education requirements often become obscured under the weight of the sheer amount and type of knowledge to be dealt with.

            Balch (2004), in a similar vein, told of how Dewey’s ideas for higher education have been lost.  Dewey (as cited in Balch, 2004) had hoped that, ultimately, there would be in higher education those who would endorse and support a free exchange of ideas independent of external pressures.  Specifically pointing out inadequacies in the humanities and social sciences, Balch (2004) bemoaned that while some good and beneficial work is in evidence in these fields, it’s primarily work of a descriptive nature, and “sweeping applications of new knowledge” (para. 4) that reach outside of academia are in short supply.

            Balch (2004) has advocated a revival of “intellectual pluralism in higher education” (para. 6), but also noted that in order to accomplish this change colleges and universities would need to actively take steps to maximize discourse and to minimize the power of conservancy to squelch the new and the innovative.  There would, Balch (2006) acknowledged, be a risk of creating competing hegemonies developed via “an ideological quota system” (para. 19), but, ultimately, institutions of higher education need to actively encourage and nurture intellectual diversity.

            David Horowitz (2004) authored the Academic Bill of Rights, which is based, he said, upon the principles of and the tradition surrounding the aforementioned Dewey-founded American Association of University Professors; he did this as part of an effort to formally set down the principles of intellectual diversity and freedom for students and professors alike.  As the author of the Academic Bill of Rights, which has been considered for adoption by a number of colleges and universities, Horowitz (2004) recognized the presence of pragmatism in academia and further acknowledged, in proper pragmatic fashion, the principle that “knowledge is uncertain and, at times, relative” (para. 13).

            Actively encouraging and nurturing intellectual diversity would, without a doubt, be a purely pragmatic endeavor, for doing so would, by definition, strive against a stagnation and a regression to the lowest common denominator proscribed from without by those who would dogmatically seek to affirm only one reality as being worthy of consideration and note.  Given pragmatism’s general bent toward celebrating the individual and Dewey’s specific application of this principle to education, it would not only celebrate the individual student’s reality in higher education circles, but would also foster an environment where all manner of conflicting realities can be heard from and be debated and, perhaps, be reconciled with previous knowledge to create something new and unique.

            This effort to create something new and unique, by the way, is an inherent part of qualitative research.  Qualitative research, as defined by Merriam (2001), is “an umbrella concept covering several forms of inquiry that help us understand and explain the meaning of social phenomena” (p. 5).  The general characteristics that typify qualitative research can readily be seen in pragmatism, and, thusly, the metaphysical, epistemological, axiological, and logical assumptions of pragmatism can be seen to inform the process of qualitative research.

            Tellingly, Merriam (2001) defined qualitative researchers as those who “are interested in understanding the meaning people have constructed, that is, how they make sense of their world and the experiences they have in the world” (p. 6).  Machan (1977) and Drake (1933/1968), in regards to pragmatic metaphysics, celebrated the paradoxes of multiple realities that are individually created.  Eames (1977), remember, also acknowledged this multiplicity of realities and asserted further that pragmatism is vital to understanding these emergent alternative views.  The metaphysical ethos of qualitative research falls neatly into line with this aspect of pragmatic philosophy.

            Additionally, Merriam (2001) stated that a prime hallmark of qualitative research is the notion that people not only create their own realities, but that these realities are based upon their individual experiences and relationships.  This directly harkens back to Eames (1977) and his assertion that individuals pick and choose, based upon their own subjective and often changeable desires, those parts of the world to focus their energies upon.  Qualitative research, then, by its nature, keys in on this pragmatic axiological diversity.

            The very nature of qualitative research, for the most part, matches the epistemological bent of pragmatism.  While pragmatism does embrace and utilize certain quantitative disciplines, choosing, as Eames (1977) said, “from among the various specific procedures those which are useful” (p. 128), pragmatism is uniquely suited, it would seem, to the purported goal of qualitative research, as defined by Merriam (2001):  to understand individual idiosyncratic realities.

            Related to this idea is the very way that a qualitative research project is constructed.  Merriam (2001) stated that a qualitative study’s design is not rigidly codified and dictatorial, but, rather, it’s adaptable, capable of responding to change as it may become warranted as a result of the researcher’s experiences in actually conducting their investigations.  This flexibility is very pragmatic, for it allows the researcher to, as necessary, shift the axiological focus the study in the face of new metaphysical data from the research subject(s).

            For, as Merriam (2001) stated, there’s an underlying assumption in qualitative research “that meaning is embedded in people’s experiences and that this meaning is mediated through the investigator’s own perceptions” (p. 6) and that, further, a qualitative study “primarily employs an inductive research strategy.  That is, this type of research builds abstractions, concepts, hypotheses, or theories rather than tests existing theory.  Often qualitative studies are undertaken because there is a lack of theory, or existing theory fails to adequately explain a phenomenon.” (p. 7).

            Qualitative research seeks to explain the phenomena on its own terms and to proffer new hypotheses based upon this explanation and exploration.  The diversity of the stories that are told are celebrated and appreciated, and, on one level, the qualitative researcher acts as an instrument so that these stories can be told, preserving as much as possible the actual words and images of the subjects being studied (Merriam, 2001).  This ethos goes along quite nicely with pragmatism.  Remember, as Eames (1977) stated, from a logical standpoint, pragmatism is no stranger to inductive reasoning. 

            These basic assumptions inherent in pragmatic philosophy – the metaphysical, the axiological, the epistemological, and the logical – all point toward, by way of hasty summary, an appreciation and celebration of the individual.  Thus, while accepting of quantitative research methods, pragmatism seems to be especially aligned with the theories and practices of qualitative research.

            Metaphysically, again, pragmatism embraces and celebrates a diversity of often contradictory and changeable realities.  From an axiological standpoint, pragmatism places emphasis on what the individual values and/or desires.  With its inclusion of inductive logical reason, pragmatism’s epistemological bent embraces qualitative research, for inductive logical reasoning is, on one level, at the core of qualitative research.

            Qualitative research, however, differs significantly from quantitative research, both in philosophical foundation and, by extension, in actual practice.  Quantitative research is the primary tool of realism, of the belief that there is only one reality possible and that it is the researcher’s job to determine that reality (Mertens, 1998).  Dewey (as cited in Murphy, 1990) was critical of this “notion that empirical scientific research can tell us about a reality that is what it is apart from human needs and interests” (p. 2).  There is one reality, static and unchanging, according to realism, that, as it is external to them, people approach on its own terms by means, primarily, of deductive reasoning.

            Therefore, as Merriam (2001) indicated, quantitative research “takes apart phenomena to examine component parts (which become the variables of the study)” (p. 6), whereas “qualitative research can reveal how all the parts work together to form a whole” (p. 6).  Quantitative research “measures variables in a quantifiable way” (Mertens, 1998, p. 3), whereas qualitative research “captures holistic pictures using words” (Mertens, 1998, p. 3).

            Coming as they do from different theoretical and philosophical bases, then, quantitative research and qualitative research are very different at their foundations and, by extension, in their actual execution.  There are a number of differences in the actual practice of quantitative research and qualitative research.  These differences include methods of gathering data, analyzing data, and reporting data.

            Data gathering by quantitative researchers involves putting as much distance as possible between the researcher and the subject(s) under consideration.  This distance is accomplished by the use of standardized instruments given to randomly chosen samples of a certain pre-determined size under as close to homogenous conditions as possible.  Qualitative researcher, however, advocate the use of themselves and their individual powers of perception and discernment as the primary tool for data collection (Borg and Gall, 1989), and whereas a qualitative research plan is flexible and is open to modification on the fly, quantitative research plans are heavily codified and are not typically changed once begun (Merriam, 2001).

            Data analysis for quantitative researchers is accomplished via the medium of statistical analysis and tests (Borg and Gall, 1989) in a deductive manner (Merriam, 2001).  Qualitative researchers, though, just as they use themselves as data collection instruments, depend upon their own individual interpretation when analyzing the data (Borg and Gall, 1989), calling upon their own inductive powers (Merriam, 2001).

            When ultimately reported, quantitative data is presented in the form of summaries of how the numerical data was analyzed statistically, but qualitative results come in the form of verbal narratives.  The results of quantitative research can be used to generalize somewhat expansively as a certain theoretical similarity is assumed, but with qualitative research, the results are seen as being idiosyncratic and, thus, not directly applicable to any but the individual subject in question (Borg and Gall, 1989).

            As can be seen, then, qualitative research and quantitative research differ in philosophical underpinning and, by natural extension, they differ in actual practice.  Whereas the one (qualitative) seeks to piece together to form a whole, the other (quantitative) seeks to take apart to see how the bits work.  Whichever method one embraces, obviously, is going to be dependent upon the individual’s own philosophical propensity and proclivity.
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